We consider a model of intermediated trade for a financial asset. Agents' valuation for the asset includes both a private and a common value component. A third party posts a price at which trade can occur, and a buyer and seller simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the trade. We show that trade can be ex post inefficient, in the sense that a high value seller sells the good to a lower value buyer. Under specified conditions, any price at which trade occurs leads to inefficient trade with positive probability. We compare two objectives: volume maximization and welfare maximization. With symmetric priors over agents' private values, these lead to the same outcome, but, in general, imply different prices. Both objectives imply that a consummated trade is inefficient with positive probability. We consider two notions of informativeness, value informativeness and allocative informativeness. There is a tradeoff between informativeness and volume or welfare. In particular, small transactions costs, which reduce the volume of trade, can improve the informativeness of the outcome.
Introduction
A standard economic argument is that trade makes agents better off. Further, the prices at which trades are consummated are used as a guide to both the Pareto optimal allocation and the value of the good being traded. The robustness of this argument is especially important for financial assets. First, the policy goal of regulators is to reduce transaction costs, and increase the volume of trade and, second, market prices are used to allocate resources (in capital budgeting) and determine payoffs (including compensation). The textbook intuition is derived absent a market structure. Do these properties hold if agents, for whom there is some potential gain to trade, meet in a marketplace? To answer this question, we construct a model of trade in a financial asset.
In our model, the asset value consists of both a private and common value component. There is a single buyer and a single seller, who trade in the presence of two-sided asymmetric information. That is, both buyer and seller are uncertain about the motives of the other party to the trade. We model the market as an intermediated one with posted prices. Traders are, therefore, price-takers, who observe the market price and decide whether to trade. However, they are strategic: in particular, we consider Bayesian Nash equilibria of this trading game.
Most financial assets are traded in some variant of an intermediated market, in that agents do not trade bilaterally. Rather, trades are consummated through the intervention of a market maker or other intermediary. The Nasdaq stock market and the trillion dollar swap market 1 are important examples. Different markets are designed in different ways and have different objectives. Further, the price at which agents trade depends on the specific market in which they trade. However, irrespective of how prices are formed in any decentralized market, all voluntary trades must be incentive compatible. We take the view that a particular market structure essentially implies a selection mechanism from the set of prices at which trade is incentive compatible.
In any model of financial assets, it is reasonable to assume that assets have both common and private values. That is, there is an element of asset ownership which all agents value equally and an element which is idiosyncratic. Further, it is reasonable to expect that there will be private information in the market: given the potentially adversarial nature of trade, one cannot credibly communicate all private information. Since there is no reason to suppose that private information exists only on one side of the market, we consider two-sided asymmetric information.
If there is uncertainty about an agent's private valuation for trade (e.g., his portfolio and tax bill is confidential), then two traders who meet in a market do not necessarily know who values the good more highly, and thus do not know the Pareto optimal allocation between the two of them. However, will trade let them discover who should own the good, and after trade will the high valuation agent own the good? We show that, under certain conditions (in particular, if the priors over the private values of seller and buyer are identical), any price at which trade occurs results in an ex post inefficient outcome with positive probability. That is, with positive probability, the "wrong" agent gets the good. In particular, a high private value agent may sell the asset to a low private value buyer, implying that agents traded away from a Pareto optimal allocation.
In such a situation, the Pareto efficient outcome is not common knowledge amongst the agents. This is of interest because, if trade does not lead to common knowledge of Pareto optimality, the conditions of the Milgrom and Stokey (1982) no-trade theorem do not apply. 2 This then, leaves open the possibility of multiple rounds of trade between the same agents, which is a step towards explaining the high volumes seen in financial markets.
We model a market as a selection device on the set of prices at which there is positive volume. Traders in our market are faced with prices posted in the market. While not formally modeled, these are implicitly chosen by an intermediary such as a market-maker. We focus on two particular goals for this selection device: volume maximization and welfare maximization. The latter is a natural benchmark to consider, while the former is a reasonable approximation of the objective function of most exchanges. For profit maximizing exchanges, consummated trades are verifiable, and therefore can be used as a benchmark to determine payments. We show that volume maximization is neither necessary nor sufficient for ex ante welfare maximization. If the existence of gains to trade is not certain, whether prices are chosen to maximize ex ante welfare or volume, the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge after trade is consummated. However, if both agents refuse to trade, it is immediately revealed that the seller has a higher private value than the buyer.
Formally, agents in our model have a two-dimensional type, akin to the model of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2001) . The latter consider an auction with two-dimensional types, and demonstrate that for the allocation in the auction to be efficient, both the number of items and the number of agents must become large. In contrast, we model a single buyer-seller pair, trading at a price set by an uninformed third party. In many financial markets, agents are "negligible" in the sense that they take prices as given (i.e., they do not directly negotiate the terms of their trade) however they are "large" in that trades are handled individually. That is, they are continuous rather than batch auctions. Therefore, though the overall volume in the market can be large, trades occur sequentially, and it is natural to model traders' entry and exit as sequential.
Much of the prior literature on bilateral trade has focused on the pure private values case. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) demonstrate the impossibility of fully efficient trade in this setting. They show that there does not exist any incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism in the static game that exhausts gains from trade. The inefficiency in our model goes further, in that some of the trades that do occur are ex post inefficient. Of course, these trades are also incentive compatible and individually rational for both agents. However, a seller, for example, cannot determine whether the buyer wants to trade as a result of a high common value signal or a high private value. Hence, with positive probability, trades are inefficient.
Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) consider a specific mechanism in the pure private values context, the k-double auction, and demonstrate that there exists an equilibrium in which the inefficiency goes to zero as the number of traders becomes large. On the surface, a restriction to trading at posted prices appears to limit the strategy space of the agents. However, it is easy to show that the equilibria we exhibit can be sustained as equilibria of the k-double auction.
The posted price mechanism has some nice properties in the private values case. As Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) demonstrate, within a large class of bilateral trade mechanisms, those with posted prices are the only ones in which agents have a dominant strategy. In our setting, types are two dimensional, and agents do not have dominant strategies. The consumption value of the good depends on the type of the counterparty. Since, in equilibrium, inferences about this type depend on the strategy of the counterparty, an agent does not have a dominant strategy. In addition, we find that ex post traders can be made worse off by participating in the market. Thus, our markets need not be ex post individually rational.
In our model, each agent receives a public signal that is partially informative about the other agent's type. This reduces uncertainty to a single dimension. Further, changes in this public signal then proxy for changes in the importance of the common value component. A signal which fully reveals the common value component of the other agent, for example, reduces the model to one of pure private values. Compared to the private values case, we find that the equilibrium volume increases with the addition of uncertainty about the common value component. This is consistent with the results of Levin (2001) , who finds that, with one-sided asymmetric information, and common knowledge that gains to trade exist, information can either increase or decrease the volume of trade.
We consider two notions of price informativeness in our setting. Allocative informativeness relates to whether agents in the market will learn the Pareto optimal allocation by the end of the trading period. A second notion, value informativeness, relates to the information provided to third parties (including, possibly, traders outside the market at that point of time) about the common value of the asset. We demonstrate a tradeoff between volume and welfare, and either notion of informativeness. In particular, transactions costs, which impede trade, and therefore hurt volume and welfare, can improve the informativeness of prices. A small transactions cost leads to a reduction in ex post inefficiencies, making it easier for agents to learn the Pareto optimal allocation of the good.
Our work contrasts with the literature on rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in financial markets in that our agents are explicitly strategic. The usual REE assumption is that strategic effects are negligible. We argue that the explicit timing of trades is as important as the overall number of agents, or the overall volume, in a market over some finite period of time. That is, while there may be many traders and trades in a financial market in the course of a day or a week, trades occur sequentially at very small time intervals in the course of the period.
3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model, and Section 3 the equilibria of the trading game. We compare volume and welfare maximization in Section 4, followed by a discussion of informativeness in Section 5. All proofs are in the Appendix, Section 7.
Model
Consider a market economy with one asset and two agents. We arbitrarily assign one of the agents to be the buyer and the other to be a seller. The consumption value to agent i, (i ∈ {b, s}), of the asset has two parts: a private value component, and a common value one. In particular,
where p ∈ (0, 1). The signals v s and v b affect the utility of agents from both populations, and are thus common value signals. w i only affects the consumption value of agent i and thus represents a private value of consumption.
When p = 1, the asset has pure common value, so that any allocation is Paretooptimal, and agents have no incentive to trade. When p = 0, the agents have purely private values, and the single-period model reduces to the framework of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , who demonstrate that there does not exist an individually rational, incentive compatible mechanism that exhausts all gains from trade. By contrast, we show that, when p ∈ (0, 1), some of the individually rational trades that occur are inefficient, in the sense that the seller has a lower private valuation than the buyer.
The two components of utility are similar to those used by Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) . Many financial assets can be modeled in this manner. The set of cash flows yielded by a financial asset is typically independent of the owner, and hence represents a common value for the asset. However, the value of the asset to an owner can also depend on, for example, the risk preferences of the owner, or particular hedging needs that depend on the rest of the owner's portfolio. Thus, there is a private value component.
The structure of the common value in this model resembles that of the wallet game introduced by Klemperer. In particular, this structure allows us to preserve the independence of the common value signals. This provides analytic simplicity and enables closed-form solutions in our model. However, the intuition of the model goes through even when this assumption is relaxed.
At period 0, nature independently draws v s and v b from an atomless distribution over [0, 1], and w s and w b from possibly different distributions, also over [0, 1]. We assume that each agent has some public information about the other agents' signals. In particular, we assume that agent j knows
Given the structure of the utility function, this is a proxy for agent i's willingness to pay for the asset. In particular, if a third party made agent i a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the good, her willingness to pay is increasing in v i and w i . In the case of financial assets, such public information may come from, for example, analyst forecasts on stock prices. These are both publicly available and diverse. Hence, they serve as a noisy proxy of what agents may be willing to pay for a good.
Observe that, when q = 1, each agent knows v s and v b . Hence, this case reduces to pure private values. Conversely, q = 0 represents the extreme adverse selection case. In particular, if q = 0 and x s = x b , we have pure common values: the consumption value of the good is exactly the same to each agent. The implication of p ∈ (0, 1) is that the asset has both a common value and private value component in consumption. However, information (as revealed through x) can effectively eliminate the strategic effects associated with one of these components.
Formally, nature announces the proxy for the willingness to pay of each agent. Thus, x s and x b are common knowledge, but the split between v i and w i are private to each agent. The distributions from which these signals are drawn and the parameters p and q are also common knowledge. Thus, agents receive imperfect information about the each other.
On a technical note, the public signal allows uncertainty over agent types to be represented in a single dimension. If agents do not observe the public signal, we have two-dimensional uncertainty. Since agents are risk-neutral, we expect the results obtained under one-dimensional uncertainty to go through in this case (since extending to two dimensions involves taking an expectation over a prior on the second dimension). The market proceeds as follows. Given beliefs over the types of seller and buyer, the market mechanism generates and posts a price, r. Then, each of the two agents in the market simultaneously decides whether to accept or reject the trade. If both agents accept, the good is transferred from the owner to the other agent, in exchange for the monetary payment, r.
Thus, agents in our model are price takers. This assumption is appropriate in large, liquid financial markets. In these, agents typically do not know the counterparty to any trade, though they have beliefs over the population from which a counterparty may be drawn. Indeed, a reasonable representation of market orders in equity markets is that agents see a posted price, and decide whether they want to trade at that price.
Once the market assigns a price, r, the strategy of each agent is to select an action, The Pareto optimal allocation is common knowledge at any time if a third party's beliefs over agents' types are such that the upper bound of the support of the belief over agent s is less than or equal to the support of the belief over agent b, or vice versa. In this case, all agents know the Pareto optimal allocation. Further, agent s knows that agent b knows the Pareto optimal allocation (since the beliefs of agent b over s are the same as the market-maker's beliefs over s), and vice versa. Since hierarchies of beliefs over other players' beliefs are trivial in this setting, second-order knowledge is equivalent to common knowledge of Pareto optimality.
Definition 1 (i) An allocation is
Pareto optimal if the good is owned by the agent with the higher private valuation (w i ).
(ii) The Pareto optimal allocation is common knowledge given beliefs [
In particular, therefore, the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge if and only ifw
Thus, common knowledge of Pareto optimality is a property of the supports of the (prior or posterior) distributions.
Market Outcomes
First, consider the strategies of buyer and seller, at time 1, after a price, r has been announced. Each of the two agents observes r, and decides whether to accept the trade (a i = 1) or reject it (a i = 0). Since r is chosen by an uninformed third party, it conveys no information about the type of either buyer or seller.
We consider Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the trading game. In general, each type may be playing a mixed strategy. Let σ i (w) denote the probability that type w of agent i chooses to accept the trade (i.e., chooses
dy denote the unconditional probability that an agent will accept the trade.
Each of the buyer and seller, in choosing their respective optimal strategies, must condition on the strategy of the other player. The latter may reveal information about the private value (and hence common value signal) about the other player. Since this information is payoff-relevant to an agent, she must condition her strategy on it. Thus, let E σ v i denote the expected value of agent i conditional on agent i accepting the trade at time 1.
First, we show that, in any equilibrium in which there is strictly positive probability that the other agent will accept the trade, the set of types of an agent that will trade is convex. Further, in any such equilibrium, each type of the agent (except possibly for a set of null measure) has a strict best response, and hence plays a pure strategy.
Lemma 1 Suppose
Hence, in any equilibrium in which there is positive probability that the seller will accept the trade, we can limit attention to buyer types playing pure strategies. There may be a marginal buyer indifferent to accepting the trade, but she has measure zero, so it is without loss of generality to specify that she accepts the trade with probability 1. Similarly, we restrict attention to seller types playing pure strategies.
Therefore, any such equilibrium can be characterized by sets
is the set of seller types who accept the trade (with probability 1) at the price r, and B(·) is the corresponding set of buyer types. Given Lemma 1, we can define
Further, if S is non-empty, it can be characterized as [w . A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is therefore characterized by sets S, B that simultaneously solve equations (15) and (16). Since the strategy of the seller depends on the strategy of the buyer, and vice versa, neither equation in isolation can be interpreted as a demand or supply equation. However, a solution to this system is interpretable as the intersection of demand and supply curves.
We note in passing that, irrespective of the priors, there always exists an equilibrium in which each type of buyer and seller rejects the trade. Given that no buyer wishes to trade, it is a (weak) best response for each seller to reject the trade. In this equilibrium no information about types is revealed. Hence, if the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge before period 1, it cannot be common knowledge after period 1. We therefore focus on equilibria in which agents can learn about each other's type; that is, at least one of the sets S and B are non-empty.
Observe that, given the linearity of the model,
and 
Definition 2 Given a resale price r, the expected volume of trade, ρ(r), is
Hence, the expected volume of trade is strictly positive if and only if the sets S and B both have positive measure.
. Since v i and w i must both be between 0 and 1, the prior at time zero must satisfy certain restrictions. In particular, we have w i 0 = max{0, min[1,
For some realizations of the joint signal x, therefore, common knowledge of the Pareto optimal allocation is immediate. In particular, consider two signals, x andx. If x −x ≥ q, then even though there is uncertainty about the common value of the good, it is common knowledge that the efficient allocation has the agent with signal x owning the good. Hence, trade will only occur if the population with the low private value of the good is assigned to be a seller.
Suppose first that the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge before the trading game at period 1. Then, for any price r in the market, either S or B is non-empty in equilibrium. Further, there exist prices at which the volume of trade is positive.
Thus, we can define a feasible price as one in which the ex ante volume of trade is strictly positive:
We first demonstrate that the set of feasible prices, R, can be non-empty. Conversely, suppose the Pareto optimal allocation is common knowledge. Then, trade will only occur if the low valuation agent is assigned the good. Further, in the latter case, there exists a price r at which all types of buyers and all types of sellers will trade. To some extent, this renders the question of informativeness moot in the economy. However for completeness, The maximum difference between a seller and buyer type who are both willing to trade isŵ s −ŵ b . Hence, the maximal welfare loss from a trade is (1 − p)(ŵ s −ŵ b ). If this loss is positive, then, with positive probability, a trade that occurs is ex post inefficient: the seller has a higher private valuation than the buyer. Similarly, in equilibrium, expected welfare gain from a trade is ( 
Definition 3 Given a resale price r, (i) the expected gain to trade is G(r)
First, we show that, if trade occurs, there is a welfare gain in expected terms. Further, the maximal loss resulting from the trade is bounded. Later, we show that when q < 1, this loss is strictly positive at the volume-maximizing and welfaremaximizing prices.
Lemma 4 Suppose that the volume of trade at price r is strictly positive. Then, (i) G(r) > 0, and (ii)
Part (i) of the Lemma ensures that the trade is individually rational for both parties. Part (ii) states that the maximal loss is bounded, relative to the expected gain from trade. Suppose that q = 1, so that we are in the pure private values case. Then, if trade occurs,L(r) ≤ 0. That is, all trades that occur are efficient.
Using Lemma 4, we can redefine the set of prices at which there is positive volume,
}. These are the prices at which it is incentive compatible for both the buyer and the seller to trade. Thus, any incentive compatible market design must generate a price that lies in R. The elements in this set can be interpreted as prices at which (ex ante) demand and supply are in balance.
At prices at which there is common knowledge of the Pareto optimal allocation, trades can never be ex post inefficient. No agent would trade given that the only motive for trade is information. However, if there is not common knowledge of Pareto optimality, there may be ex post inefficient outcomes. Thus, an agent might trade off gains from trade against the possibility of informational trading. For the rest of this paper, we assume thatw
(that is, the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge).
LetR be the subset of feasible prices at which there is positive probability of inefficient trade. ThenR
Thus, if the market mechanism generates a price inR, then the outcome could be Pareto inefficient. We first show that, under the maintained assumptions, if q < 1, there is an open set of prices at which there is positive probability that a trade is ex post inefficient. Further, under the conditions specified, the sets R andR are equal; that is, at any price at which there is positive volume, there is a positive probability that a trade is ex post inefficient. In particular, if the support of the priors held by market participants over buyers and sellers are the same, then all trades at which there is positive volume can result in ex post inefficient outcomes. Observe that the result does not require the beliefs themselves to be the same. For example, in market for a particular stock, third parties do not know a trader's portfolio position and thus do not know how he wishes to rebalance. Ex post, of course conditional on information signals and the fact that he has consummated a trade, they draw an inference about his desire for trade.
The implication of this is, that if the priors over buyer and seller type are the same, then any incentive compatible mechanism yields ex post inefficient outcomes with positive probability. Thus, not all gains from trade are consummated in one round and prices do not reflect the marginal willingness to pay.
Finally, we define the ex ante welfare in this market. Welfare is the sum of the buyer's and seller's indirect utility. Since maximizing welfare is equivalent to maximizing the ex ante welfare gain from trade, we consider the ex ante welfare gains from trade. Thus,
Definition 4
The ex ante welfare gain at a price r, Ω, is
Since
we can also write welfare as
Specific Price Selection Devices
We have specified the set of prices at which volume will be strictly positive. The actual price that will obtain in a market depends on the design of the market. Different designs may be viewed as selection mechanisms that pick prices in R. Since, in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a price r implies a set of sellers, S(r), and buyers, B(r), who trade, we can alternatively view the market as choosing these sets, S and B. (4) and (5) can be added to eliminate r, and obtain
Further, beliefs in Bayesian Nash equilibrium must be consistent, that is, the support of the posteriors must be weakly contained in the support of the priors.
Hence, the market design problem can be viewed as choosing a price to maximize an objective function, subject to (7) and the following constraints:
It is immediate that, for any resale price r, the outcome of the mechanism in the static case can be sustained as an equilibrium of the k-double auction. Since the prior literature has considered the pure private values case, we provide a formal statement and proof, for completeness. As shown by Satterthwaite and Williams (1988) , the k-double auction has a twoparameter continuum of equilibria. Hence, any price selection device in our market can be viewed as a selection device on this continuum. 6 We consider two specific selection devices from R: volume maximization and welfare maximization. We focus on the latter because it is a natural benchmark against which to compare all prices, while the former is a reasonable approximation of current practice in equity markets.
Suppose that a market seeks to maximize volume. Then, the problem is:
subject to : Constraints (7)- (8) Since the payoffs of the agents are continuous inw s and w b , the existence of an equilibrium in the trading game, for a given r, is immediate. For this maximization problem to be well-behaved, we further require that the objective function be continuous. That is, there should exist a continuous selection from the correspondence that defines the equilibrium in the subgame given a choice of r.
Similarly, a price formation mechanism that maximizes welfare, can also be viewed as one that choosesŵ s ,ŵ b subject to the constraints (7) and (8) . The objective function in this case is
From Proposition 1, any price selection device, including welfare maximization and volume maximization can be associated with ex post inefficient outcomes. We now 6 Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), for the case of k = 1 2 , examine the linear equilibrium of the double auction in the pure private values case. This equilibrium certainly has more interesting properties than a fixed price equilibrium (for example, it maximizes welfare, subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality, over all mechanisms if the types of both agents are uniform over [0, 1] ). However, it is only one equilibrium in a continuum.
show a stronger result: under volume or welfare maximization, if the Pareto optimal allocation before the trading period is not common knowledge, then any trade that occurs is inefficient with positive probability. This holds even if the conditions of Proposition 1 do not. That is, even whenR ⊂ R, so that there exist prices at which all consummated trades are efficient, an attempt to maximize ex ante welfare or volume will result in a price inR. The implication ofL > 0 is that there is positive probability that the seller had a higher private valuation than the buyer. In other words, with positive probability, any trade that occurs is ex post inefficient. The restriction q < 1 ensures that there is uncertainty about the common value of the asset. In the pure private values case, as mentioned earlier,L = 0.
The assumption that the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge further implies that p < 1. In the pure common values case, any allocation is Pareto optimal. Hence, the proposition implies that, as long as both a common value component and a private value one exist, there is positive probability that a consummated trade was ex post inefficient.
Therefore, under either volume or welfare maximization, after a trade has occurred, agents do not know the Pareto optimal allocation. In particular, there is positive probability that the seller had a higher private value than the buyer. Conversely, it turns out, if both seller and buyer reject the trade at r, it is revealed (and is common knowledge) that the seller has a higher private value than the buyer. Indeed, this is the only situation under which the Pareto optimal allocation is common knowledge. Curiously, while Milgrom and Stokey (1982) show that common knowledge that the current allocation is Pareto optimal implies that there is no trade, in our setting, the refusal to trade results in common knowledge that the current allocation is Pareto optimal.
Proposition 5 Suppose that (i) q < 1, (ii) the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge before the trading period, (iii) w
Propositions 3 through 5 suggest that there is a trade-off between volume or welfare, and the informativeness of prices. In particular, an impediment to trade that reduces volume or welfare may enhance agents' understanding about the Pareto optimal allocation in the market. We consider such a tradeoff in Section 5. For now, we turn to an explicit comparison of volume and welfare maximization.
Volume Maximization and Welfare Maximization
In this section, we compare the two objectives of volume and welfare maximization. In summary, we find that the two imply the same outcome if prior distributions are equal and symmetric. Generically, we do not expect beliefs about the private motives for trade of a buyer and a seller to be the same. Indeed, if the history of trading is complicated, the distributions could be different. Further, in the context of the model, the possible private values for the asset lie in the range, max{0,
] . Thus, it is natural to consider cases where the support of the beliefs of the market, conditional on x j are not the same. There is also no a priori reason to suspect that the belief distribution in a marketplace is symmetric. While diffuse priors are reasonable if there is no information about type, it is also very intuitive to believe that the private type of a buyer is higher than that of a seller. We note in passing, that the canonical finance model in which agents have exponential utility and uncorrelated normally distributed endowment shocks induces symmetric priors.
In general, however, beliefs will not be equal and symmetric and hence, the outcome of a volume maximizing market may be different from one that maximizes welfare. This is true even in the pure private values case. Thus, volume-maximization is neither necessary nor sufficient for welfare-maximization. Frequently these two objectives are taken to be synonymous. Further, some existing market structures, such as the opening on the NYSE and the algorithm of the Arizona Stock Exchange, are explicitly designed to generate maximum volume. This goal is also formulated by, for example, Duffie and Jackson (1988) , who consider an exchange designing securities to maximize the volume of trade.
For analytic convenience and to compare properties of distributions, in this section only, we add the additional assumption that the supports of the priors over buyer and seller are the same. That is, we assume that [w With this additional assumption, it is straightforward to show that the solution to both problems (volume and welfare maximization) will involveŵ s ,ŵ b (the type of seller and buyer who are indifferent between trading and not) strictly in the interior.
Hence, the constraint (7),
will bind at the solution, and we can ignore constraints (8) .
Definew as the unique value of w that satisfies
In the pure private values case (q = 1), we can derive a necessary and sufficient condition for volume-maximization to coincide with welfare-maximization. 
Condition (9) in Proposition 6 is immediately seen to be satisfied when F b = F s = F (say), and F is symmetric about the point 1 2 . Two examples of symmetric distributions include the uniform, and the triangular distribution with a peak at 1 2 . If q = 1, then trade only occurs if the buyer's private type is larger than the seller's (as the common value component is known by all). Thus, for a symmetric distribution, it follows that volume is maximal if a price is chosen so that the median type is indifferent between buying and selling. Further, the gains to trade are the difference between the expected value of the buyer and the expected value of the seller. Given that agents buy low and sell high, if the median trader is indifferent, changing the price and thus changing the indifferent trader, increases the expected value of the buyer by the same amount as the decrease in expected value of the seller. Thus, the gains are offset by the loss, if the distribution is symmetric and welfare is at an optimum.
If the distribution is not symmetric then the changes in expected value of the buyers and sellers do not move in tandem. The following example demonstrates the importance of symmetry in satisfying condition (9) .
Example 1 Let F be the triangular distribution with a peak at 1, so that f (x) = 2x, and
, and
). It is immediate to see that condition (9) is not satisfied.
Therefore, even when the prior distributions over buyer and seller type are identical, a lack of symmetry in the prior implies that volume-maximization and welfaremaximization need not coincide. There certainly exist prior distributions such that these two coincide (the uniform being a prime example); conversely, there exist distributions under which they differ. If the conditional distributions over buyer and seller type do not have the same support, then again volume and welfare maximization can differ.
Next, suppose that q < 1, so that there is an unknown common value component to consumption. While a necessary condition is more difficult to determine, in this case, we can show that, if the prior distributions are equal and symmetric, volume and welfare-maximization coincide.
Proposition 7 Suppose q < 1, and
where F is symmetric about the point 1 2 . Then, there exists a volume-maximization solution that also maximizes welfare.
Symmetry of the underlying beliefs, therefore, is in general a sufficient condition for volume maximization to be equivalent to welfare maximization. Frequently, in the finance literature, hedging motives for trade (or inventory shocks) are assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution. However, in the context of this model, it is important to note that, given x s , x b , F s and F b need not have the same support. Whereas the equivalence result goes through for the uniform distribution regardless of support, for other symmetric distributions (e.g. the triangular), non-equal supports lead to a difference between volume maximization and welfare maximization.
Informativeness of Prices
In addition to facilitating trade, posted prices convey information both to market participants and to agents not currently in the market. In our model, there are two senses in which prices could be informative. First, can market participants infer the Pareto optimal allocation from trade and quote data? We refer to this as allocative informativeness. Second, if a third party uses either trades or quotes from this intermediated market, can it infer the underlying common value of the asset? This question is especially pertinent if prices are used to allocate resources (as in capital budgeting). We term this value informativeness. Notice, we distinguish between trades and quotes. Prices at which trades are consummated convey different information than prices at which it is not. Further, both sorts of information are usually readily available to market participants.
Allocative Informativeness
First, consider allocative informativeness. We have demonstrated that, if there is uncertainty about the common value component, neither volume maximization nor welfare maximization lead to common knowledge of the Pareto optimal allocation. Thus, trade is not "informative."
We define the allocative informativeness of a price as the ex ante probability that the Pareto optimal allocation will be commonly known at the end of the trading period. Recall thatŵ s is the marginal seller indifferent between selling and not, and w b is similarly the marginal buyer.
Definition 6
The allocative informativeness at an equilibrium is given by I a = Prob(the Pareto optimal allocation is common knowledge at the end of the trading period).
This definition includes the possibility of trade and no trade. In general, trade can lead to ex post inefficient outcomes and thus the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge. However, we show in this section that, in this situation, a positive transactions cost (which reduces both volume and welfare) can lead to greater allocative informativeness.
Formally, suppose both buyer and seller pay a fee
if the trade is consummated. This fee can be interpreted as either the commission charged by a broker, or the spread charged by a market maker. However, to the extent that we consider goals such as volume maximization or welfare maximization, this market maker does not have a monetary payoff. With a positive transactions fee, his payoff can now be described in monetary terms. In this case, the transactions fee will be chosen to maximize the market maker's profit. However, competition or regulation may restrict the fee to a particular level, in which case profit and volume maximization will be equivalent.
With the inclusion of a transactions fee,
, the incentive compatibility conditions for the seller and buyer (equations (4) and (5)) now become 
and the expression holds with equality ifŵ s ,ŵ b are both in the interior of their respective supports. Hence, the measure of value informativeness reduces to the following. Let 1 X be an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the event X occurs, and 0 otherwise. 
Recall that, if F s = F b , and the prior distribution is symmetric about 1 2 , then volume and welfare maximization yield the same price. However, we show that an appropriate transactions cost increases allocative informativeness. Of course, a transactions cost reduces volume (and ex ante welfare, since volume and welfare maximization are equivalent under the symmetry assumption). There is, therefore, a genuine tradeoff between allocative informativeness and welfare.
Lett be defined as follows:
Then, in the symmetric case, for all t ∈ [0,t], allocative informativeness increases in t, whereas volume decreases in t. The transactions costt maximizes allocative informativeness.
where F is symmetric about 1 2 , and a volume-maximizing price is chosen. Then, a transactions costt maximizes I a . Further, I a is increasing in t for all t ∈ (0,t).
Value Informativeness
Next, we turn to value informativeness. We take the perspective of a third party observing the market outcome (i.e., the quoted price and the strategies of the buyer and seller). In particular, therefore, we assume this third party can observe if there was excess demand (the buyer was willing to trade but the seller not) or excess supply (vice versa).
The third party is also assumed to observe x s , x b . Hence, it has the same prior over w s as the buyer, and the same prior over w b as the seller. Given a market outcome, it updates its priors on the possible type of seller and buyer. The posterior so obtained will imply a particular range for the common value component. We take this range as the fundamental measure of value informativeness, with the added complication that we consider ex ante informativeness, so that the probabilities of types being drawn from S, B must be taken into account. Thus, we consider the expected dispersion of beliefs about the common value after observing the market.
Suppose 
Hence, the minimum value of v is v =
Similarly, the maximum value of v isv =
Hence, the possible range of v is
Now, there are four possible outcomes that can occur in the market in any given period. We list these outcomes and the associated supports over seller and buyer types. 
The ex ante range of possible common values, therefore, is
is a constant, this motivates the following definition of value informativeness.
Definition 7
The value informativeness at an equilibrium is given by
As with allocative informativeness, there is a role for transactions costs in enhancing value informativeness. In particular, under symmetry, the transactions cost that maximizes allocative informativeness also maximizes value informativeness. Hence, regardless of whether one thinks of informativeness in terms of values or allocations, there is a tradeoff between informativeness and welfare.
where F is symmetric about 1 2 , and a volume-maximizing price is chosen. Then, a transactions costt maximizes I v . Further, I v is increasing in t for all t ∈ (0,t).
Under symmetry, it is straightforward to show that, if the transactions cost is zero, then volume maximization is equivalent to maximizing value informativeness. However, with a transactions cost, the two objectives diverge. While maximizing the ex ante welfare of market participants is equivalent to maximizing volume, the welfare of non-participants can depend on the informativeness of prices, which is enhanced by a small transactions cost.
Regulators frequently attempt to control or reduce transaction costs in asset markets. This, certainly, is one policy goal of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States. If a small transaction cost increases value informativeness, the transfer from the traders in the market must be weighed against the social benefit of reducing uncertainty about v. Further, in as much as trade may lead to ex post inefficient outcomes, there can be "too much trade." Thus, a transactions cost which deters some trade may be optimal.
Conclusion
In a model of intermediated trade in the presence of double-sided asymmetric information, we find that individually rational, incentive compatible trade can lead to ex post inefficient outcomes. In particular, prices that maximize volume or welfare imply that every trade is inefficient with positive probability. Note that the existence of any trade in the financial markets, given Milgrom and Stokey (1982) , suggests a lack of common knowledge that agents are at a Pareto optimal allocation. Casual empiricism suggests that information about private hedging motives is not available in any financial market, so that agents' motives for trade are unknown. In this setting, we expect trades to result in ex post inefficiencies, providing a motivation for further rounds of trading among the same set of agents. Thus, we suspect that part of the volume of trade we observe in markets today is inefficient.
We further find that a price which maximizes welfare is not necessarily the same as that which maximizes volume. We do derive conditions under which these objectives coincide. However, these conditions are on market participants' beliefs over the motives for trade of buyers and sellers. Such beliefs are unobservable. To the extent that volume and welfare maximization imply different prices, rules and regulations designed to improve one objective need not help with the other.
We also consider the value and allocative informativeness of market outcomes. Imposing a transactions cost on traders can help improve the informativeness, in terms of knowledge about both the Pareto optimal allocation and the common value of the asset. However, such a transactions cost deters trade, and possibly reduces ex ante welfare.
Caution should therefore be exercised in applying the intuition that more trade enhances welfare and liquid markets (those in which there is a high volume of trade) are more informative. Market regulators in the United States, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are concerned with transaction costs and encourage their reduction. Further, exchanges (either profit maximizing or mutual organizations), encourage high volume. This too, may not increase aggregate welfare.
Finally, we note that innovations designed to increase the speed with which orders are executed are likely to exacerbate the tendency toward sequential trading. That is, at any given instant in the market, only a small number of orders may be present. Strategic considerations are therefore potentially important, even if the number of orders executed in a day or week is large.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose
A seller of type w s will sell at price r with positive probability only if her consumption value, conditional on the buyer types she may be trading with, is less than the resale price r. That is,
Now, in equilibrium, the beliefs about both types w s andŵ s over the set of buyers who trade must be the same, and must be consistent with σ b . Further, q > p. Hence, ifŵ s < w s , it follows that
Therefore, in equilibrium, σ s 1 (ŵ s ) = 1. The proof for the buyer is exactly similar: in equilibrium, a buyer of type w b will accept the trade with positive probability only if her consumption value, conditional on the set of types she may be trading with, is greater than the resale price. Following the argument through, we obtain the second part of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose does not want to sell at r, it must be that her consumption value conditional on trade exceeds r, or
Similarly, since a buyer of typew b 0 does not want to buy at r, we have
Subtracting the first equation from the second, we have
(else the Pareto optimal allocation is common knowledge). Hence, the LHS is positive, and the RHS negative, which is a contradiction.
Next, we show that there exists a price r at which the volume of trade is positive. Suppose not, so that, at any price, one of S and B is of null measure in equilibrium. 
Further, since B is of null measure,
Subtracting (13) 
Proof of Lemma 3
(i) This part is immediate; there cannot exist a price r at which it is individually rational for both agents to trade.
(ii) From equation (4), a seller of typew
Similarly, a buyer with type w
where the expectations are taken with respect to the prior at time 1. Hence, (q − p)w
. Then, at the price r z , all types of seller and buyer will trade.
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose there is a price r at which both S and B are non-empty. Letŵ s be the highest type of seller who sells, andŵ b the lowest type of buyer who buys. From equations (4) and (5) in the text, it must be that
Multiplying the second equation by −1 and adding to the first one, we have 
Proof of Proposition 1
The following Lemma will be useful in both parts of the Proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Given r, let S 1 (r) and B 1 (r) be the sets of seller and buyer types, respectively, who trade in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resale market. As shown earlier, Finally, suppose S 1 is non-empty, and B 1 is empty. In the k-double auction, assign strategies to seller types as in the previous paragraph, and let buyer types all bid 0. The converse case (B 1 non-empty, S 1 empty) is similarly handled.
Proof of Proposition 3
First, we state and prove the following Lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose both (a) and (b) of the Lemma are violated. We show that there exists a price which generates higher volume, contradicting the hypothesis that a volumemaximizing price was chosen.
Since 
should also want to buy. Now, consider raising the resale price to r + . This strictly increases the set of seller types who sell, so thatŵ s increases tow s . This increases E S w s . However, for small enough, it must be the case thatŵ b = w b 0 as before. Hence, raising the price to r + , for small enough, strictly increases the volume of trade, so that original choice of resale price, r , could not have been volume-maximizing.
Next, suppose that (16) is a weak inequality, so that (q−p)ŵ b +p(x s +x b )−E S w s 1 ) > qr. A similar argument shows that lowering the price to r − strictly increases volume. Now, back to the Proof of the Proposition. From Lemma 2, if the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge after time t − 1, there exists a pricer 1 at which there is a positive volume of trade. A fortiori, at the volume-maximizing price, the volume of trade must be strictly positive.
Consider the second part of the Proposition. From Lemma 6, at the volumemaximizing price, either (a) all buyer and seller types trade, or (b) condition (7) is satisfied with equality. Suppose (a) For the "only if" part, there are three other cases to consider: (i) both parties accept the trade. In this case, Propositions 3 and 4 directly show that the Pareto optimal allocation is not common knowledge. This case is similar to case (ii) above; we again derive a contradiction if we assume that the Pareto optimal allocation is common knowledge after the trading period.
Proof of Proposition 6
The first-order conditions for volume-maximization are: 
Proof of Proposition 10
Consider the problem of maximizing I v , subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (12) . As with volume and welfare maximization, we express the problem withŵ s ,ŵ b as the choice variables. In equilibrium, (12) will hold as an equality. Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint. Then, the first-order conditions for the maximization are: . Since F b = F s at this point, it satisfies equation (29). Given this point,t as defined satisfies equation (28). Hence,t maximizes I v .
The argument for I v increasing in t for t ∈ (0,t) is similar to the argument for I a increasing in this range (see Proposition 9 above).
